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Illustrative Suggestions for Amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules 
 
 
We at the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) are grateful for the opportunity to 
provide input to the ICSID Secretariat regarding proposed revisions to ICSID’s arbitration rules. 
 
CCSI, as a joint center of Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute at Columbia University, 
focuses on international investment, including related dispute resolution mechanisms, and the 
impacts such investment and dispute resolution can have on inclusive, rights-compliant sustainable 
development. While not comprehensive, our comments below briefly highlight some issues that we 
believe need to be addressed on a priority basis in order to help address some of the gaps regarding 
the legitimacy and fairness of investor-state arbitration. This submission is not meant to be 
exhaustive. CCSI looks forward to opportunities to further engage in ongoing discussions on 
priorities and options for reform. 
 
We thank you for your consideration of this submission. 
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Recognizing and safeguarding the rights and interests of non-parties 
 
Disputes between two litigating parties often impact the rights and interests of those not party to 
the litigation or arbitration.1 In recognition of that reality, the procedural rules governing some 
systems of dispute resolution (1) provide a mechanism for mandatory or permissive joinder by 
those interested or affected non-parties, and (2) require dismissal of cases when a non-party’s rights 
will be affected by the dispute resolution proceedings but cannot join them.2 
 
ICSID’s arbitration rules (like other arbitration rules commonly used in investor-state arbitration) 
contain no such protections for interested and affected non-parties. Consequently, the litigation 
positions adopted in and outcomes of investor-state arbitral disputes risk harming the rights of other 
natural and legal persons. We thus urge that ICSID address this issue to ensure fairness to non-
parties and recommend adoption of a rule mandating dismissal of claims or cases in which (1) the 
rights or interests of non-parties will be affected by the arbitration, and (2) those non-parties are 
not willing or able to join the arbitration as parties.  
Improving transparency of the dispute resolution process  
 
Nearly four years ago, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 
recognizing “the need for provisions on transparency in the settlement of treaty-based investor-
State disputes to take account of the public interest involved in such arbitrations,” adopted its Rules 
on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (the “Transparency Rules”).3 ICSID, 
however, has yet to similarly update its rules and bring them in line with modern norms regarding 
transparency and good governance. 
 
In other contexts, the World Bank Group has highlighted the significance of transparency for 
improved governance of, and accountability regarding, investment. The World Bank’s recently 
revised Environmental and Social Standard (ESS),4 for example, highlights the importance of open 
																																																								
1  There are innumerable circumstances in which arbitration/litigation can affect non-parties’ rights and 
interests; this submission does not purport to catalogue them. Nevertheless, they can include situations in 
which the dispute involves 
• a challenge to the validity of a court/arbitral award received by a non-party to the 
litigation/arbitration in a separate proceeding;  
• a claim by shareholders regarding alleged harms to a non-party corporation; and  
• a claim by one entity to obtain a permit or other permission to use or occupy land over which there 
are also competing claims by individuals or communities. 
Risks to the rights and interests of non-parties may be particularly acute in cases involving disputes over 
access to land or resources, in claims for injunctive or declaratory relief, and in cases requiring judgments 
regarding the legitimacy of non-parties’ rights or actions.  
2 See, e.g., US Fed. R. Civ. Proc. R. 19(a) & (b).  
3 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, forty-sixth session (July 8-26, 2013), 
Gen. Assem., supp. no. 17, para. 128. The Transparency Rules are available on UNCITRAL’s website, 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf. 
For more information on the Transparency Rules, see Lise Johnson and Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, 
“New UNCITRAL arbitration rules on transparency: Application, content and next steps,” August 2013, pp. 
23-25. 
4 World Bank Environmental and Social Framework (August 4, 2016), available at: 
http://consultations.worldbank.org/Data/hub/files/consultation-template/review-and-update-world-bank-
safeguard-policies/en/materials/the_esf_clean_final_for_public_disclosure_post_board_august_4.pdf. Note 
that Environmental and Social Standard 10 (ESS10) regarding Stakeholder Engagement and Information 
Disclosure applies to all projects supported by the Bank through Investment Project Financing. See ESS10, 
para. 4.  
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and transparent engagement around investment projects throughout their life-cycle “as an essential 
element of good international practice.”5 To be meaningful, this transparency regarding investor-
state relations must include dispute resolution processes at the national and international levels. 
 
Indeed, the lack of transparency investor-state dispute settlement has been identified by critics as 
one of the features that undermines the legitimacy and accountability of the current system.6 UN 
human rights experts, among others, have publicly voiced concern about the impact of investor-
state dispute settlement on human rights, pointing to inter alia the lack of transparency in the 
current system.7  
 
Supporters of investor-state arbitration are also concerned about the lack of transparency, as they 
recognize that transparency of the system is inexorably tied to its legitimacy. Proponents often 
argue that the system can improve domestic rule of law in the host state.8 However, by excluding 
interested third parties (including project-affected sectors of host state citizens) from accessing 
information about disputes, the current system arguably runs counter to rule of law principles of 
equality, accountability, fairness, and procedural and legal transparency.9 Moreover, the lack of 
transparency prevents states and investors from understanding the law that applies to them, and 
their rights and obligations under that law.  
 
We urge ICSID and its state parties to recall UN member states’ commitments under Goal 16 of 
the Sustainable Development Goals to inter alia promote the rule of law, and to “[d]evelop 
effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels.”10 Fulfilling these commitments 
requires, among other things, ensuring transparency of investor-state arbitrations.  
 
In this effort to ensure transparency of international arbitration, ICSID is aided by the work of 
UNCITRAL, which established an important framework for transparency of treaty-based investor-
state arbitration, and by the growing number of treaties that also require transparency of the 
investor-state disputes that arise under them. Importantly, ICSID could and should also advance 
the standard for its peers by ensuring transparency of contract-based disputes in addition to treaty-
based investment disputes.  
 
Owing to the significance of investor-state contracts for the governance and outcomes of 
international investment,11 consensus is emerging on the need for greater transparency around these 
																																																								
5 Id., para. 1.  
6 See Lise Johnson and Lisa Sachs, “International investment agreements, 2013: A review of trends and new 
approaches” in Andrea K Bjorklund (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2013–2014 
(Oxford University Press 2015) 59-64.  
7 See e.g., “Investor-State dispute settlement undermines rule of law and democracy, UN expert tells Council 
of Europe,” (April 19, 2016); “International trade: UN expert calls for abolition of Investor-state dispute 
settlement arbitrations” (October 26, 2015); “UN experts voice concern over adverse impact of free trade and 
investment agreements on human rights” (June 2, 2015).  
8 See e.g., Benjamin K. Guthrie, “Beyond Investment Protection: An Examination of the Potential Influence 
of Investment Treaties on Domestic Rule of Law,” (2013) 45 NYU Journal of International Law & Politics 
1151 (for a summary of arguments in support of this statement).   
9 See Report of the Secretary-General to the UN Security Council, “The rule of law and transitional justice 
in conflict and post-conflict societies” (August 23, 2004) UN Doc. S/2004/616.  
10 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Targets 16.3 and 16.6 respectively.  
11  On the significance of investor-state contracts for the governance and outcomes of international 
investment, see e.g., Kaitlin Cordes, Lise Johnson, and Szoke-Burke, “Land Deal Dilemmas: Grievances, 
Human Rights, and Investor Protections,” Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (2016); Lorenzo 
Cotula, “Foreign Investment, Law and Sustainable Development: A Handbook on Agriculture and Extractive 
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agreements. This consensus is evident in certain guidelines and principles regarding responsible 
international investment,12 and in the steps that some host states have taken to advance or require 
contract disclosure. 13  Moreover, proactive disclosure of investor-state contracts is arguably 
required under existing host and home state obligations to respect, protect and fulfill rights to 
participation and access to information, protected under several existing human rights treaties to 
which many (or most) ICSID contracting and signatory states are party.14  This obligation to 
proactively disclose arises from both the general public interest nature of investor-state contracts 
(which involve the exercise of state powers and form a key source of rules governing international 
investment), and from the specific implications that investor-state contracts can have for affected 
individuals and communities in the context of international investment.15 The rationale underlying 
arguments for proactive disclosure of investor-state contracts can be extended to investor-state 
disputes based in, or concerning, these agreements. Investor-state disputes can, among other things: 
result in the interpretation of contractual commitments in a manner that profoundly affects the 
underlying investment, and rights and obligations of the contracting parties; allow for enforcement 
of investor-state contracts deemed illegal or invalid under domestic law; and require or result in the 
renegotiation of these agreements.  
 
The need for transparency of investor-state contracts thus implies a need for transparency of any 
processes and outcomes that may affect the content and enforcement of these agreements, including 
investor-state dispute settlement. These issues should therefore also form a part of ICSID’s 
upcoming efforts to modernize its rules. 
Promoting transparency of ownership 
 
Driven in part by tax planning strategies and regulatory arbitrage, ownership structures for 
investments are increasingly and infamously complex. One consequence is that respondent states 
may have difficulty assessing whether investor/claimants are actually entitled to protection under 
the relevant investment treaty that is being invoked. Rather than requiring states to embark on costly 
and wasteful efforts to disentangle corporate ownership structures each time they face a case, the 
																																																								
Industries,” (Natural Resource Issues No. 31.) International Institute for Environment and Development 
(2016); Carin Smaller, with contributions from H. Mann, N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, L. Pinter, M. 
McCandless, and J. Parry, “The IISD Guide to Negotiating Investment Contracts for Farmland and Water,” 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (2014). 
12 For example, following a review of guidelines and principles regarding land governance and responsible 
investment, the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment found that most prominent best practice 
recommendations call for transparency around land-based investments, with many such guidelines calling 
for disclosure of land contracts specifically. See Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 
“Recommending Transparency in Land-Based Investment: A Summary of Relevant Guidelines and 
Principles,” (March 2016). More generally, the UN Principles for Responsible Contracts, endorsed by the 
Human Rights Council in 2011, recommend that “[t]he contract’s terms should be disclosed.” See UN 
Principles for Responsible Contracts (2015). The Principles were endorsed as part of the Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights on June 16, 2011. See UN Human Rights Council Resolution 17/4 on Human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises (UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4).   
13 With respect to extractive industry investments, contract disclosure is fast becoming the norm among 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) countries. As of March 2017, at least 29 host states had 
published some contracts, licenses or leases pertaining to extractive industry projects. See Don Hubert and 
Rob Pitman, “Past the Tipping Point? Contract Disclosure within EITI,” Natural Resource Governance 
Institute (March 2017). A handful of states have also taken steps to disclose investor-state contracts 
concerning commercial agriculture and forestry projects.  
14 See Jesse Coleman and Kaitlin Y. Cordes, “Articulating a Rights-Based Argument for Land Contract 
Disclosure” (forthcoming).  
15 Id.   
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ICSID arbitration rules should require companies to fully disclose their corporate family structures 
and beneficial owners when filing a request for arbitration. In addition to helping reduce the time 
and expense of arbitration by clarifying certain issues at the outset of the dispute, such a rule on 
early disclosure would also likely reduce incentives for companies to abuse the flexibilities afforded 
by corporate law, and would enable other interested and potentially affected individuals and entities 
such as creditors and shareholders to be aware of the case.      
Preventing abuse of requests for interim measures  
 
In a growing number of cases, investor/claimants in investor-state disputes are seeking interim 
measures of injunctive relief that aim to compel states to halt their own governmental investigations 
of or claims against the investor relating to the investor’s alleged wrongdoing.16 In other cases, 
requests for interim measures of injunctive relief ask for an order compelling the state to halt 
litigation private parties have brought against the investor, or to stop private parties from collecting 
sums awarded against the investor through separate legal proceedings.17  
 
These types of requests can potentially interfere with legitimate government and private actions to 
hold investors accountable for harms they cause in the host state. Given the persistent challenges 
that many host countries and communities face in terms of securing relief for injuries caused by 
projects involving foreign investment, 18  giving investors these added tools for avoiding 
responsibility is particularly problematic. 
 
Revision of ICSID’s arbitration rules should therefore seek to prevent investors from abusing 
requests for interim measures through, for example, bans on such requests or rules requiring 
imposition of financial penalties on investors who seek to shut down any non-frivolous case or 
investigation against the investor.  
Preventing actual and apparent conflicts of interest 
 
The independence and impartiality of dispute settlement mechanisms, including investor-state 
arbitration, is critical for preserving the credibility and viability of such mechanisms. Under current 
ICSID arbitration rules, however, guarantees of independence and impartiality are inadequate. 
 
Among the issues that should be addressed in this context are the practice of arbitrators wearing 
“dual hats” – simultaneously practicing both as arbitrators and counsel in investor-state arbitral 
disputes. ICSID arbitration rules should be revised to preclude that practice. Similarly, the 
procedures by which challenges are decided should be revised. The present system, whereby a 
challenge to one arbitrator is resolved by his/her two fellow arbitrators, “does not fulfill the 
																																																								
16 See, e.g., Luke Eric Peterson, Analysis: Arbitrators Revoke an Interim Measures Decision, But Continue 
to Offer Little Explanation for How ‘Procedural Integrity of Arbitration’ Was in Peril, IA Reporter (Oct. 18, 
2016); Joel Dahlquist, Interim Tax-Related Measures Revealed to Have Been Ordered by Full ICC Tribunal 
– Constituted on an Expedited Basis – and Later Vacated, IA Reporter (Mar. 21, 2016).  
17 See, e.g., Luke Eric Peterson, ICSID Tribunal Orders State-Owned Companies to Work to Get Local Court 
Injunction Lifted, IAReporter (Jul. 20, 2016); Luke Eric Peterson, In “Show Cause” Proceeding, Chevron 
Quantifies Alleged Losses Due to Ecuador’s Failure to Block Enforcement of Lago Agrio Judgment, 
IAReporter (Nov. 19, 2013). 
18 See, e.g., Guide to Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in Investment 
Policymaking (The Laboratory for Advanced Research on the Global Economy & the LSE Investment and 
Human Rights Project, 2016), at 18 (quoting OHCHR Report, UN doc A/HRC/29/39, para 25; Progress 
report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on legal options and practical measures 
to improve access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuses (May 2014)). 
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appearance-of-independence requirement, and thus undermines the normative and sociological 
legitimacy” of arbitral tribunals.19 
Addressing concerns raised by third-party funding 
 
The apparent rise of third-party funding in investor-state arbitration raises a host of concerns 
relating to, among other things, potential conflicts of interests and the ability of respondent states 
to recover costs awarded against unsuccessful and insolvent claimants. Depending on the nature of 
the funding arrangement, third-party funding may also potentially impact the fundamental question 
of who is the investor/claimant, and whether that investor/claimant is – and should be – protected 
under international investment treaties and the ICSID Convention given the object and purpose of 
those instruments.  
 
It is crucial to launch a multi-stakeholder dialogue on the role of third-party funders in ICSID 
investor-state arbitration, and to consider rules for governing whether, in what circumstances, and 
under what conditions different funding arrangements may be permitted.20 
Ensuring legitimacy of settlement agreements21 
 
A significant percentage of investor–state dispute settlement claims are reportedly settled between 
the parties to the dispute before an award is issued.22 While settlements can be seen as positive 
outcomes, saving parties the time and expense of arbitration and permitting more certainty over an 
outcome, in the context of disputes involving governments, settlements raise threats to principles 
of good governance, including government accountability, respect for the rule of law, transparency, 
and respect for citizens’ rights and interests under domestic law and international human rights 
norms.23  When a settlement agreement also includes the settlement of a counterclaim, the threats 
are exacerbated.  
 
Settlements can significantly impact, often negatively, the rights and interests of non-parties to the 
dispute,24 and could also allow a governments to avoid legislatively established norms that govern 
																																																								
19  Chiara Giorgetti, Between Legitimacy and Control: Challenges and Recusals and Arbitrators in 
International Courts and Tribunals. 49 George Washington International Law Review 205, 208-09 (2016). 
20The Singapore Investment Arbitration Centre (SIAC) is the first arbitration institution to include rules 
expressly addressing third party funding. See, e.g., SIAC Investment Arbitration Rules, Rules 24.1 & 33.1. 
21 This section on settlement summarizes a recent publication by Lise Johnson & Brooke Skartvedt Guven, 
“The Settlement of Investment Disputes: A Discussion of Democratic Accountability and the Public 
Interest,” Investment Treaty News (March 13, 2017). 
22 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (June 2016). Investor–state dispute 
settlement: Review of developments in 2015. IIA Issues Note, 2. Retrieved from 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2016d4_en.pdf. 
23 See United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (UN OHCHR). Good governance 
and human rights. 
24 Kaitlin Y. Cordes, et al., Land deal dilemmas: Grievances, human rights, and investor protections (March 
2016). (highlighting how competing claims of non-parties may be marginalized; see, generally, Morley, M. 
T. (2014). Consent of the governed or consent of the government? The problems with consent decrees in 
government-defendant cases. Journal of Constitutional Law, 16(3), 637–696, pp. 647–649. Retrieved from 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jcl/vol16/iss3/2. See also Lise Johnson & Lisa Sachs,  The TPP’s investment 




the rulemaking process.25 While various rules and mechanisms exist in some domestic contexts for 
public and judicial oversight of settlement agreements,26 ICSID’s arbitration rules do not currently 
contain protections for non-party rights and interests, or mechanisms for ensuring public oversight 
of proposed settlement agreements. As such, any rule revisions surrounding settlement would need 
to go hand-in-hand with rule revisions surrounding transparency and the rights and interests of non-
parties.  
Ensuring legitimacy of the rule revision process  
 
To date, roughly 600 investor-state arbitrations have been brought against states around the world 
under ICSID’s arbitration rules.27 ICSID’s arbitration rules thus have significant and growing 
implications for issues of fundamental importance around the world.  
 
The mere fact that the cases are brought against states, involving allegations of government 
wrongdoing and potential liability, makes them important matters of public concern. But the nature 
of the disputes and the range of laws, policies, practices, actions and omissions they challenge 
magnify these arbitrations’ relevance for non-parties. And, just as the public needs to be enabled to 
play a greater role in framing the substantive standards of protection that are used as the basis for 
investor-state cases (both treaty- and contract-based), the public must be engaged in this rule 
revision process. This is particularly so given that the content of procedural rules can play a 
determinative role in shaping substantive outcomes. We therefore commend ICSID for enabling 
public participation in this phase of its process, and emphasize the importance of continued efforts 




.   
																																																								
25 U.S. Chamber of Commerce. (2013, May). Sue and settle: Regulating behind closed doors, p. 3. Retrieved 
from https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/SUEANDSETTLEREPORT-
Final.pdf. 
26 See supra n.21. 
27 ICSID, The ICSID Caseload - Statistics (Issue 2017-1), 7. 
